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Commercialization of Public Broadcasting
By CRAIG AUSTIN DUNAGAN*
I
Introduction
There is a growing awareness of the trend towards commer-
cialization of the public broadcasting industry, but little is be-
ing done to stop, or even to slow, this development. Efforts
begun by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in
1977 to nip commercialism in the bud, resulted in 1981 rulemak-
ing and 1982 clarification which allowed noncommercial licen-
sees to engage in more, not less, commercial fundraising
practices.' Congress passed legislation which ratified the
Commission's unprecedented action and moved public broad-
casters one step closer to their commercial counterparts by
permitting advertisements sponsored by nonprofit entities to
be broadcast on noncommercial educational broadcasting sta-
tions.2 The question which remains is whether Congress will
remove the last vestiges of the "non" in noncommercial educa-
tional broadcasting by allowing advertisements sponsored by
profit-seeking entities to be broadcast on channels designated
to be used only for noncommercial educational broadcasting.
This trend toward commercialism is clearly inconsistent
with the reasons for establishing our national noncommercial
educational broadcasting system. Noncommercial educational
broadcasting was intended to be the counterculture of com-
mercial broadcasting. It was created because the program-
ming on commercial stations was overly commercial and
lacking in educational content.' Rarely mentioned, since the
persons who helped create the system have passed from the
scene, is the point that noncommercial educational broadcast-
ing was intended to be commercial-free broadcasting.4 More-
* Member, Third Year Class; A.B., University of Southern California, 1980.
1. See infra notes 80-102, 157-166 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 184-186 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 40-50, 208-210 and accompanying text.
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over, it was intended to be primarily educational.' An apt
description of public broadcasting today, however, is simply
"less commercial and more educational than commercial
broadcasting." Tomorrow it may be "commercial and more or
less educational." This is not what was envisioned for public
broadcasting, but this is what it is becoming.
The reasons for the encroachment of commercialism and the
current consideration of allowing noncommercial educational
broadcasters to air promotional announcements sponsored by
profit-seeking entities are tied to both the methods and
problems of financing public broadcasting operations. The
quest for a permanent means of financing is leading public
broadcasters ever nearer the heart of the commercial market-
place. The search for support has, in fact, led noncommercial
licensees along the same path taken by commercial licensees-
a path which ends with the adoption of broadcast advertising
as the means of financing station operations. Sections II and
III of this comment are devoted to documenting this trend.
The discussion there of the origin of the donor identification
rule and the liberalization of the "name only" limitation, a
facet of that rule, illustrates the current trend toward commer-
cialization. The arguments offered by noncommercial licen-
sees are examined to determine why licensees have repeatedly
sought permission to broadcast more descriptive information
about their program underwriters and why permission to do so
was ultimately granted. Section III stresses the problems of
financing which have spawned, one after another, commercial-
like fundraising practices.
Part IV of this comment discusses the noncommercial na-
ture and fundamental purpose of public broadcasting, and ana-
lyzes whether the indirect advertising represented by
underwriter acknowledgements, or the direct advertising rep-
resented by promotional announcements and commercials, is a
feasible funding mechanism in light of such nature and pur-
pose. Considerations germane to this discussion include the
nature of the service which should be provided by noncommer-
cial licensees and the extent to which indirect and direct ad-
vertising are compatible with the purposes of public
broadcasting. Analysis of these issues is essential to deter-
mine whether public broadcasters should be allowed to sell
5. See infra notes 38, 49-50, 53-57, 204-207 and accompanying text.
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broadcast time for advertising.6 This comment concludes that
advertising should not be allowed and calls for a reversal of the
trend towards commercialization of public broadcasting. How-
ever, in the event that Congress decides to allow advertising on
noncommercial stations, the comment argues that only "in-
fomercials" (informational-commercials) should be permitted.
II
The Historical Evolution of Commercial-Free
Broadcasting
A. The Birth of Broadcasting, the Need for a Permanent Financial
Base and the Advertising Solution
When our national system of broadcasting was founded in
the early 1920's, there was no plan for its use and financing.7
"Anyone who applied and met the requirements of American
citizenship or incorporation was legally entitled to get a broad-
casting license."8  Entities procuring such licenses included
manufacturers of communications equipment, set dealers, ed-
ucational institutions, publishers, department stores and reli-
gious institutions.' Notably, the programming provided by
these entities was commercial free.10
During this era, programming was relatively inexpensive and
broadcasters generally bore the cost. For some, the expense of
programming was defrayed by public attraction to the broad-
caster's business establishment. For communications equip-
ment manufacturers and station operators, Westinghouse and
Radio Corporation of America (RCA), programming was pro-
vided to stimulate sales of their radio receivers and parts."
6. There are also pragmatic, perhaps compelling, reasons against allowing public
broadcasters to sell broadcast time for advertising. A suggestion of some of the
problems is noted infra at footnote 253. Discussion of the issues is, however, beyond
the scope of this comment.
7. R. BLAKELEY, To SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST 38 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
BLAKELEY].
8. Radio Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 302 (1912).
9. BLAKELEY, supra note 7, at 38.
10. S. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 112 (3d ed. 1976).
11. Noncommercial Educational Stations, 26 F.C.C. 2d 339, 348 (1970) (Johnson, N.,
dissenting). See also DocuMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 18 (F. Kahn 3d ed. 1978)
(discusses the emergence of broadcast advertising); 1 E. BARNOUW, A HISTORY OF
BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES, A TOWER IN BABEL 105 (1966).
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Thus, for some early station owners, programming itself
achieved the results of advertising.
As the novelty of radio began to subside and production
costs increased, the need for a permanent financial base be-
came apparent. As early as 1922, sponsored programming, a
form of advertising calculated to create and maintain the good-
will of the sponsor, had emerged to help commercial licensees
offset program production costs. 12 Such "indirect" advertising
had become sufficiently widespread to invoke the following
criticism:
Anyone who doubts the reality, the imminence of the problem
has only to listen about him for plenty of evidence. Driblets of
advertising, most of it indirect so far, to be sure, but still unmis-
takable, are floating through the ether every day. Concerts are
seasoned here and there with a dash of advertising paprika.
You can't miss it; every little classic number has a slogan all its
own, and if it is only the mere mention of the name--and the
street address and the phone number--of the music house
which arranged the program. More of this sort of thing may be
expected. And once the avalanche gets a good start, nothing
short of an Act of Congress or a repetition of Noah's excite-
ment will suffice to stop it.13
The dashes of "advertising paprika" were followed by even
less savory direct advertising. Direct advertisements men-
tioned specific commodities, quoted prices and solicited orders
to be sent directly to the advertiser or to the radio station. 4
The broadcasting of such advertisements heightened the pub-
lic controversy regarding the propriety of broadcast advertis-
ing.'" Indeed, the public controversy soon would become a
legislative concern.
Speaking at the First Washington Radio Conference, then
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover stated that, "[iIt is in-
conceivable that we should allow so great a possibility for serv-
12. Indirect advertising was prevalent when the first commercial was aired on a
commercial radio station. See DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 18 (F. Kahn 3d
ed. 1978) for a discussion of the broadcast of the first commercial and see H. WARNER,
RADIO AND TELEVISION LAw 309 n.3 and accompanying text (1938 photo. reprint 1976)
for a discussion of indirect advertising broadcasts during the same period.
13. G.L. ARCHER, HISTORY OF RADIO TO 1926, at 285 (1938) (published by American
Historical Society, Inc. of New York) (quoting Radio Broadcast, Nov., 1922).
14. See H. WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAw 407 (1938 photo. reprint 1976)
[hereinafter cited as WARNER].
15. See id.
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ice to be drowned in advertising chatter."16 In Hoover's view,
direct advertising threatened to supplant radio's intended role
as a provider of public affairs, cultural, educational and en-
tertainment programming. Moreover, he believed direct adver-
tising would drive the listening public away from radio.17 At
subsequent radio conferences, however, the Secretary an-
nounced that indirect advertising might be employed to win
and hold the listening public.' 8 A similar view was taken by
the Radio Conference Committee on Advertising and Public-
ity, which concluded that the consensus of public opinion was
that both direct and mixed direct/indirect advertising were
objectionable. 9
Congress, however, would reach a different conclusion. Re-
flected in the radio legislation considered from 1924 to the pas-
sage of the Radio Act of 1927 is the general acceptance of the
view that the radio industry should be supported and main-
tained by sales of commercial time.20 In the Radio Act of 1927,
Congress created an administrative body known as the Federal
Radio Commission (FRC) to regulate radio broadcasting and
"prescribe the nature of the service to be rendered by each
class of licensed stations and each station within every
class."'" It thus became the FRC's duty to decide whether
commercial radio stations should be allowed to continue to
broadcast advertisements.
Not surprisingly, the FRC's decision turned less upon a
weighing and balancing of policy considerations than upon the
financial consequences of banning advertising.22 In its Third
Annual Report the FRC concluded:
If a rule against advertising were enforced, the public would be
deprived of millions of dollars worth of programs which are be-
ing given out entirely by concerns simply for the resultant
goodwill which is believed to accrue to the broadcaster or the
16. H. HOOVER, MEMOIRS: THE CABINET AND THE PRESIDENCY 140 (4th ed. 1965).
Hoover's comment was made in an address to the First Annual Radio Conference in
1922.
17. WARNER, supra note 14, at 423.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 423, 424.
20. Id. at 424. For a discussion of some of the legislation see id. at 309, 310 and 320.
21. Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), 47 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1976).
22. See FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION, THIRD ANNuAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL RADIO
COMMISSION TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 35 (1929) (United States Gov't
Printing Office) [hereinafter cited as TInRD ANNUAL REPORT), reprinted in HISTORY OF
BROADCASTING: RADIO TO TELEVISION (C. Sterling ed. 1971).
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advertiser by the announcement of his name and business in
connection with programs. Advertising must be accepted for
the present as the sole means of support for broadcasting
23
A possible compromise would have been to permit indirect ad-
vertising, such as program sponsorship, and prohibit direct ad-
vertising. Under this scheme, business names could still be
mentioned in connection with programs, the resultant goodwill
would still accrue, and, theoretically at least, millions of dollars
would still be given out for programs. However, as is evident
from the foregoing quotation, the FRC did not distinguish be-
tween forms of advertising, and despite the fact that the FRC's
argument applies primarily to the resulting benefits of indirect
advertising, its decision tacitly approves direct advertising.
In retrospect, the practicality of the FRC's decision is appar-
ent. Commercial-free broadcasting was no longer economi-
cally feasible and radio service in many parts of the United
States was either inadequate or non-existent. Advertising rev-
enues would not only provide the means of support for existing
commercial stations, but could provide support for many new
stations in areas yet unserved. Prohibiting advertising would
eliminate a source of public irritation but would also eliminate
a source of funding. Even limiting advertising to certain forms
could act as a disincentive to advertisers, thereby reducing the
overall amount of advertiser-supported programming provided
to the public. Worse yet, a reduction in broadcast advertising
revenues could inhibit expansion of radio service in the United
States.24  Given these concerns, it is not surprising that the
FRC concluded that the public would have to swallow the "ad-
23. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 35. At the time, some advertisers pro-
duced the radio programming and were credited as the sponsor. Such sponsors con-
trolled program content and selection.
In contrast, advertisers now typically take no direct role in determining pro-
gram content; they are offered "spots" of 30 or 60 seconds in which to insert
their commercials, and their collective demand for spots during or adjacent to
a particular program determines whether the network retains or discontinues
the show. (There are exceptions ... an advertiser may require as a condition
of its purchase of substantial time that certain content guidelines be observed
D. GINSBURG, REGULATION OF BROADCASTING 264 (1979), and $ee generally E. BARNouw,
THE SPONSOR (1978) (discusses the lingering influence of sponsors on content).
24. COMMERCIAL RADIO ADVERTISING, S. Doc. No. 137, 72nd Cong. 1st Sess. $ 6
(1932), reprinted in SPECIAL REPORTS ON AMERICAN BROADCASTING 1932-1937, at 37 (C.
Sterling ed. 1974).
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vertising paprika" if it wanted to enjoy the fare provided to the
public by commercial licensees.
Advertising did in fact prove to be the most efficient method
of financing radio station operations, and as a result, commer-
cial radio service flourished in the United States. The financial
success of radio advertising led to the adoption of broadcast
advertising as the sole economic foundation of commercial tel-
evision. Here, especially, broadcast advertising has been lu-
crative. A recent study indicates that on a weekly basis the
major networks' average prime time revenues ranged from
slightly more than $26 million to approximately $29.7 million
each .25 Such financial success has been a paramount consider-
ation in the acceptance of advertising as the permanent means
of support for both commercial radio and television
broadcasting.
B. The Halting Development of Noncommercial Educational Radio
Broadcasting
Educational institutions were among the first to operate ra-
dio stations, but notwithstanding this fact, noncommercial edu-
cational (or public) broadcasting had a much later
development than did commercial broadcasting. This was
partly due to the different incentives which led educators into
the broadcasting business. In the final analysis, however, a
lack of permanent financing appears to be the primary factor
inhibiting the development of noncommercial educational
broadcasting in the United States.
1. Problems of Financing
Initially, educators financed the building and operation of ra-
dio stations in order to provide for physics experimentation.26
It was not until the euphoria of 1922, when commercial licen-
sees were rushing to the air in great numbers, and the public
was lining up to purchase radio receivers, that educators be-
came interested in broadcasting as a means of extension teach-
ing, as an aid to fundraising and as an adjunct to home-degree
study.
25. What It Costs TV Advertisers For 30 Seconds Of Prime Time, San Francisco
Chron., Sept. 22, 1981, at 6, col. 1.
26. G. GmsoN, THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1912-76, at 1 (1977) [herein-
after cited as GmSON].
27. In 1922, radio station WEAF, owned and operated by the University of Ne-
No. 2]
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Obtaining a broadcast license in 1922 posed no great diffi-
culty for educators.28 By the end of 1922, there were seventy-
four or seventy-five stations licensed to educational institu-
tions,29 and in 1925 the number of educational institutions hold-
ing broadcast licenses hit a high mark of 129.30 But financing,
rather than entitlement, proved to be the determining factor in
the ownership and operation of radio stations licensed to edu-
cational institutions. 1
The Great Depression and the rising cost of programming
combined to force the closing of many of the radio stations op-
erated by educational institutions. By 1931, the number of sta-
tions licensed to educational institutions had dropped by 60%
to fifty-one.2  By 1936 it had dwindled to forty.3  By 1937, all
but thirty-eight of the stations operating in the standard (AM)
band were commercial stationsm According to Federal Radio
Commissioner Harold LaFount, a chief cause of the reduction
in the number of such radio stations was the financial inability
of licensees to maintain them.35 The loss of these educational
radio stations gave rise to problems of broadcast access which
also would impede the development of public broadcasting in
the United States.
2. Problems of Access
Many of the educational institutions that could no longer af-
ford to operate their radio stations transferred their licenses to
commercial entities which promised to grant the educators
substantial access to the airwaves for presentation of educa-
tional programming. This access plan proved unsuccessful.36
braska, began offering credit courses at $12.20 per student listener. 1 E. BARNOUW, A
HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES: A TOWER IN BABEL 97 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as BARNOUW].
28. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
29. Cf. A PuBiuc TRUST: CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC BROAD-
CASTING 313 (1979) (reporting 74) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE III and GIBSON, supra
note 26, at 25 (reporting 75). The discrepancy may be due to the different tallying dates
of the studies.
30. GIBSON, supra note 26, at 21.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 40.
34. S. YOUNG LEE, STATUS REPORT OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING 1980, at 10 (1980)
(Planning and Analysis Dept., Corporation for Public Broadcasting) [hereinafter cited
as LEE].
35. GIBSON, supra note 26, at 21.
36. See GIBSON, supra note 26, at 22.
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Consequently, in a 1936 hearing before the Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) 37 on the national system of broad-
casting, educational groups claimed that the existing broadcast
structure "did not provide adequately for the application of ra-
dio to the cultural education of the public directly by educa-
tional institutions."38 In essence, the problem cited was that
continued access to radio broadcasting for educational pro-
gramming could not be assured if educational institutions had
to compete in the commercial marketplace for scarce spectrum
space or valuable broadcast time. The solution urged by these
groups was that future provision be made in a new frequency
band for educational purposes.39
3. Factors Encouraging Development of a National System
Paralleling the concern that commercial broadcasters were
failing to provide an outlet for educational programming was
the criticism that they were too often using their facilities for
radio advertising. In 1932 the Senate took note of the "growing
dissatisfaction with the present use of radio facilities for pur-
poses of commercial advertising," and began an inquiry into
commercial radio advertising.'
Senate Resolution 129 directed the Federal Radio Commis-
sion to investigate and answer a number of questions, includ-
ing, "what plans might be adopted to reduce, to limit, to
control, and perhaps to eliminate the use of radio facilities for
commercial advertising purposes."'" The FRC responded that
advertising could not be eliminated if the present system of
broadcasting were to be maintained, and emphasized that any
attempt to limit or control the amount of time used for com-
mercial advertising purposes must have its inception in new
legislation.42 Such legislation was considered, but was not
adopted as part of the Communications Act of 1934.43 The
threat of such legislation, however, prompted self-regulatory
37. The FCC was created by the Communications Act of 1934 to succeed the FRC.
38. FEDERAL COMMUNICATION COMMISSION, REPORT ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DATA
13 (Oct. 5, 1936), reprinted in SPECIAL REPORTS ON AMERICAN BROADCASTING 1932-1937,
at 13 (C. Sterling ed. 1974).
39. Id.
40. S. RES. 129, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in SPECIAL REPORTS ON
AMERICAN BROADCASTING 1932-1937, at part V (C. Sterling ed. 1974).
41. Id. at 4-5.
42. Id. at 33.
43. WARNER, supra note 14, at 427.28.
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measures by the commercial broadcast industry." Meanwhile,
the inquiry into excessive radio advertising was continued by
the newly created Federal Communications Commission.
When technological advances made possible the expansion
of broadcast services into other frequency bandwaves, the
commercial broadcasters were ready and willing to undertake
what was then an uncertain venture. The educational broad-
casters, on the other hand, were unorganized and financially
unable to undertake such a venture even if given the opportu-
nity.45 Consequently, they expressed comparatively little in-
terest in obtaining spectrum space in the new broadcast
bands.46 Nevertheless, the FCC provided educational broad-
casters with access to new broadcast channels.
In 1938, the FCC created a new class of stations designated
"noncommercial educational," and allocated twenty-five chan-
nels between 41,000 and 42,000 kilocycles for them.47 Operation
of these channels was confined largely to use in schools. The
opportunity for more versatile broadcasting was presented in
1945 when the FM band was ready for broadcasting. After ex-
tensive hearings regarding allocation of spectrum space, the
Commission reserved approximately 20% of the FM band for
the exclusive use of noncommercial educational
broadcasters."
The reservation of spectrum space in the FM band was nec-
essary to enable noncommercial educational broadcasters to
organize, raise money and plan how to begin anew in the
broadcast business.49
By reserving FM channels the Commission was tackling the
problem of excessive advertising and inadequate educational
programming on commercial stations. According to Robert
Blakely, the former head of the National Association of Educa-
tional Broadcasters, the main reason for the establishment of
our national noncommercial educational broadcast system was
the inability of the FCC, and its predecessor, the FRC, to influ-
44. See id. at 428.
45. See generally GIBSON, supra note 26, at 45-49.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 49.
48. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT OF ALLOCATIONS FROM
25,000 KC to 30,000 KC (May 25, 1945); FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT
OF ALLOCATIONS FROM 44-108 MC (June 27, 1945).
49. Sixth Report and Order, 41 F.C.C. 148, 36 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Sixth
Report].
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ence the content of the traffic on commercial stations.50 The
assurance of broadcast access provided by the Commission to
public broadcasters fostered the development of a broadcast
system which would be primarily what commercial broadcast-
ing was not-a broadcast system devoid of advertising and
abundant in educational programming.
Public radio service in the FM band, however, was not estab-
lished without the help of others. Commercial broadcasters
and the Federal Communications Commission both played key
roles in making the educators' dream a reality.
In hearings before the FCC on the allocation of the FM band,
commercial broadcasters pledged full support for the reserva-
tion of channels for the exclusive use of educators.51 Their
main reason for not contesting such an allocation was that they
believed that the prestige of educational broadcasting would
increase the overall marketing appeal of the fledgling FM band.
To receive FM signals, members of the public had to purchase
a state-of-the-art receiving set and, obviously, few people
would do so unless the service offered by FM broadcasters was
attractive. The type of programming which would be offered
by educational broadcasters, it was thought, would attract the
type of person likely to invest in FM receiving equipment. For
this reason, commercial broadcasters would benefit from the
presence of educational broadcasting in the FM band.
FCC members were also very supportive of the creation of a
noncommercial educational FM radio broadcasting service.
Commissioner Hennock, in particular, was instrumental in
persuading the Commission to set aside portions of the broad-
cast spectrum for educators' exclusive use. 2
In retrospect, the creation of noncommercial educational FM
broadcasting can be seen as the result of a number of factors,
including: 1) a decrease in the number of existing noncommer-
cial (AM) stations; 2) an increase in advertising matter on
commercial stations with a concomitant decrease in the
amount of educational programming; 3) commercial broadcast
industry support; and 4) support from the FCC.
50. BLAKELEY, supra note 7, at 49-50.
51. GiBSON, supra note 26, at 51. The author notes that "[t] hose interested in the
commercialization of FM did all the work for the educators. ... Id.
52. Id. at 70-73.
No. 21
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C. The Scholastic Programming Rationale for Public Television
Television was initially believed capable of providing a sig-
nificant supplement to more formal means of education. Dur-
ing FCC hearings held between November 1950 and January
1951, the Joint Committee on Educational Television stressed
the potential contribution which television could make to edu-
cation in arguing the need for reservation of television chan-
nels for educational stations. 3
On April 24 and 25 of 1967, educators testifying before the
Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on a
bill proposing to provide funds for acquisition of television
equipment, stated that educational television would help cor-
rect shortages of classrooms and teachers.54
In 1954, the FCC proposed rules that would set aside part of
the television broadcast band for noncommercial educational
broadcasting. According to the Commission:
the need for noncommercial educational television stations
was based upon the important contributions which noncom-
mercial educational television stations can make in educating
the people both in school-at all levels-and also the adult
public. The need for such stations was justified upon the high
quality type of programming which would be available on such
stations-programming of an entirely different character from
that available on most commercial stations.55
In later deciding to adopt this statement of policy and grant the
reservation of a portion of the UHF and VHF television bands
for exclusive use by noncommercial educational broadcasters,
the Commission noted that no commenting party took issue
with the finding that noncommercial educational stations are
necessary for the invaluable contributions they can provide in
the education of both the in-school and the adult public.5 6 Tel-
evision's potential for public education was, no doubt, an es-
sential reason for reserving portions of both the UHF and VHF
television bands for the exclusive use of noncommercial educa-
tional broadcasters.57 These reservations insured the access
53. Id. at 74-75.
54. Id. at 99.
55. Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Appendix A), 16 Fed. Reg. 3072, 3079
(1951), reprinted in DocUmENrs OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING (F. Kahn 3d ed. 1978) at
234.
56. Sixth Report, supra note 49, at 38.
57. See generally id. at 33-49.
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needed to build a national noncommercial educational televi-
sion broadcast service.
III
Sources of Financial Support
Although the problems of access were behind them, educa-
tional broadcasters still faced the difficult task of raising
enough capital to build and operate stations.58 An adequate
financial base had to be established. Congressional proposals
for a spectrum allocation tax, a receiver-use tax, and a hard-
ware excise tax were not adopted.59 Consequently, no single
method of financing was relied upon to obtain the minimum
amount of financing needed to build and operate public broad-
casting stations. Funding from private foundations, educa-
tional institutions and federal and local governments helped
many broadcasters establish themselves in the broadcast busi-
ness.60  Commercial broadcasters also helped by providing
some funding and equipment, and by lending technical assist-
ance to noncommercial licensees. 61
Private foundation grants, particularly those of the Ford
Foundation, were most instrumental in providing the financial
support necessary to establish the noncommercial educational
broadcast system.62 By the mid 1970's, however, foundation en-
dowment had declined substantially, primarily due to the Ford
Foundation's withdrawal from its role as the major institu-
58. A lack of adequate financing forced the closing of many of the early educa-
tional radio broadcasting stations. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
59. REPORT OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION, PUBLIC
TELEVISION: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION 71 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE I].
Other proposals included conversion of educational television to a pay television sys-
tem; franchise taxes upon commercial broadcasters; and a procedure by which the or-
dinary income taxes paid by commercial broadcasters would be earmarked for support
of educational broadcasting. For an argument on whether the Congress may impose a
fee on the licensed use of the electromagnetic spectrum see CARNEGIE 11, supra note
29, at 382. Some of these proposals may be reviewed by the Temporary Commission on
Alternative Financing for Public Telecommunication (TCAFPT).
60. GIBSON, supra note 26, at 55, mentions legislation passed to enable noncom-
mercial educational broadcasters obtain surplus government broadcasting equipment
at low cost.
61. Id. "Commercial broadcasters actively aided educational broadcasters, giving
them $1,250,000 worth of buildings, towers and equipment ... " Id. See supra note
51.
62. C. STERLING, THE MASS MEDIA 201 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MAss MEDIA].
The Ford Foundation has contributed over $300 million since 1951. LEE, supra note 34,
at 17.
No. 21
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tional supporter of public broadcasting. 3 By 1979, the propor-
tional share of public broadcasting income contributed by
foundations had shrunk to 3.4% from a high of 14.4% in 1967.64
Fortunately, as foundation support declined, contributions
from the federal government increased to fill the financial
gap.65
In 1979, the federal government gave noncommercial licen-
sees over $160 million dollars, approximately 27.2% of public
broadcasting's total income.66 Also in 1979, Congress author-
ized advance appropriations for public telecommunication en-
tities at record levels of $162, $172 and $172 million for fiscal
years 1981-83, respectively. 7 Consequently, Uncle Sam is now
the largest single source of public broadcasting income. But as
the moon waxes, so does it wane.
In the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1981, Con-
gress announced that 1983 will be the high water mark of fed-
eral funding, and that beginning in 1984, the trend will be
toward reduced federal financial assistance.68 The Act, and the
House Report in particular, evidence an expectation on the
part of Congress that public broadcasters should look to the
private sector for their future sustenance.6 9
Private sources of financial assistance include foundations,
individuals, 0 business and industry.7 1 Collectively, these
63. Spokesman for the Ford Foundation, Fred W. Friendly, explained to the Senate
Subcommittee on Foundations, that the foundation believes it is unhealthy for public
broadcasting to depend too much on any source of funding, including the Ford Founda-
tion. Consequently, the Ford Foundation initiates projects, nurtures them, then
weans them hoping that they can attract support from independent sources. Role of
Private Foundations in Public Broadcasting, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 87-88 (1974).
64. Id. at 87; LEE, supra note 34, at 17.
65. See LEE, supra note 34, at 15-17. Also as a result of the decline in foundation
support, contributions to public stations by individuals through direct payments, sub-
scriptions and auctions tripled during the 1966-76 period. MASS MEDIA, supra note 62,
at 194.
66. LEE, supra note 34, at 17.
67. See H.R. REP. No. 97-82, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
HousE REPORT]. Since 1975, Congress has been making five year advance authoriza-
tions and two year advance appropriations of federal funding to the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting (CPB). Pursuant to this arrangement, CPB's 1982 and 1983 appro-
priations are $172 million (each year). However, consistent with efforts to curb federal
spending, appropriations for 1984-86 are set at $130 million (each year).
68. Id. at 12, 13 [§ 1291(a)]; see also Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, §§ 1222-1233 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Act].
69. See generally Act, supra note 68, at, §§ 1230-1232 (1981). See also HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 67, at 7, 13, 14.
70. Contributions from individuals generally take three forms: cash contributions,
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sources contributed approximately 20% of public broadcast-
ing's total income in 1979.72 Whether such sources of revenue
can replace decreasing federal funding is currently a matter of
speculation. Although foundation funding has recently in-
creased, it probably will not be able to provide the support
needed in the near future.73
Attention has consequently focused on those funding mech-
anisms which have attracted, and will continue to attract, indi-
vidual, business and industry support. Such mechanisms
include subscription drives, over-the-air auctions, promotion of
program related goods and services, program underwriting and
sales of broadcast time for product and institutional advertis-
ing.74 All but the last of these mechanisms are regularly used
by public licensees. In their view these mechanisms are either
desirable or necessary to insure an adequate base of support
for their broadcast operations.75 Each of these alternatives,
however, imports commercial practices into the public broad-
cast service, a service which is required by law to be essen-
tially noncommercial.76 Subscription drives are commercial
promotions to encourage viewers and listeners to pay for the
programming which they are getting; mention and praise of
products and services in over-the-air auctions is "closely akin
to regular advertising;1 77 program-related goods and services
may in fact be advertised so long as the program related mater-
ials are sold by nonprofit organizations 78 what is termed "pro-
gram underwriting" is merely gingerly-solicited indirect
subscriptions and over-the-air auction purchases. Subscriptions and auctions are dis-
cussed in detail below in the two sections beginning after note 79.
71. Business and industry support includes, but is not limited to, cash and in-kind
contributions and program underwriting. Underwriting is discussed below in the sec-
tion beginning before note 89.
72. LEE, supra note 34, at 17 (figure 4).
73. The lion's share of foundation support for public broadcasting came from the
Ford Foundation, which has indicated that it is disinclined to resume the role of a
major supporter of public broadcasting. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
74. See infra section titled "Promotional Announcements" beginning after note
156.
75. See, e.g., National Association of Public Television Stations Opposition to Peti-
tions for Reconsideration of the FCC's Second Report and Order in Docket No. 21136,
at 4, filed July 29, 1981.
76. See 47 C.F.R. 73.503 (1981).
77. Noncommercial Educational Stations, 26 F.C.C. 2d 339, 19 (1970).
78. See Memorandum Opinion and Order in Docket No. 21136 (FCC 81-204)
(adopted July 15, 1982) 47 Fed. Reg. 36,171 (Aug. 19, 1982), 51 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1567,
1572 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum Opinion].
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advertising; 9 and sale of broadcast time for product and insti-
tutional advertising is, of course, the essence of commercial op-
eration. Because each of these methods involves a different
form or extent of advertising, the shift from public licensee re-
liance on federal funding to these and other funding alterna-
tives should not be considered apart from the effect which they
may have upon the nature of the services provided by noncom-
mercial educational broadcasters.
A. Subscription Drives
Subscription drives are ongoing promotions staged by public
broadcast licensees to encourage viewers and listeners to pay a
minimum annual fee to become a member of the public broad-
cast station in their area. Time between programs, and some
time normally used for programming, is devoted to station self-
promotion and appeals to the audience to help pay for the pro-
gramming it receives.
Recently, comments were filed in an FCC proceeding regard-
ing the alarming amount of broadcast time which some licen-
sees were devoting to subscription activity.80 In the First
Report and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking commenters urged
the adoption of regulations which would limit the amount of
broadcast time which could be devoted to such activity. The
Commission agreed that some restriction was necessary and
proposed to limit such activity to ninety hours per year.8 ' In
the Second Report and Order, however, the Commission re-
fused to impose limitations, preferring instead to allow viewer
resistance levels to determine the amount of time licensees
devote to subscription activities.2 The Commission concluded
that such grass roots support activity merely suspends pro-
gramming; it does not affect licensee programming discretion-
in fact, it facilitates it by providing licensees with uncondi-
tioned funding.8 3 In essence, the Commission has made a
value judgment that the programming disruption caused by
this commercial-like activity is a necessary evil because pres-
79. CARNEGIE I, supra note 59, at 229.
80. See First Report and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in Docket No. 21136, 69
F.C.C.2d 200, at T 2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as First Report].
81. Id. at 11 56, 57.
82. Docket No. 21136, 86 F.C.C.2d 141, at 1 25 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Second
Report].
83. See First Report, supra note 80, at 11 55, 56.
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entation of the programming depends in part upon viewer sup-
port.84
B. Broadcast Auctions
Broadcast auctions involve over-the-air sales of goods and
services donated to public broadcast stations. Station person-
nel describe and/or display the goods or services at auction,
indicate who donated the item and how much it is worth. Au-
dience members then phone in their bids and the item is sold
to the highest bidder.85
Like subscription drives, broadcast auctions disrupt program
service. In the First Report and Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing the Commission noted that
while most stations conducting auctions still conduct only one
per year, the normal auctions period is now approximately
seven to nine days, with several as long as 10 days and at least
one station's auction lasting fourteen days. The comments also
indicate that the normal auction consumes between one-third
and one-half of the station's programming each day it runs and
that several stations devote entire days to auction activities.86
For these reasons the Commission felt that some restriction on
broadcast auction activity was appropriate, and accordingly
proposed certain limitations in the First Report.8 7
In the Second Report and Order, however, the Commission
felt that the acceptance of in-kind contributions for auction
purposes did not otherwise compromise the nature of the
broadcast service.88 Although the Commission recognized that
public licensees are promoting the sale of the goods or services
at auction, and thus are engaging in direct advertising, they felt
such advertising is permissible because these donors, unlike
underwriters, are not seeking identification with particular li-
censee programming. Rather, they are seeking broadcast ex-
posure and identification with the licensee. Because these
donors are not the ones making possible the presentation of
programming, they need not, and consequently do not, concern
themselves with licensee programming choices.
Implicit in the Commission's approval of broadcast auctions
is its willingness to tolerate isolated instances of commerciali-
84. See id.
85. Noncommercial Educational Stations, 26 F.C.C. 339, 47 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Noncommercial Educational Stations].
86. First Report, supra note 80, at 47.
87. Id. at 47.
88. See Second Report, supra note 82, at 4, 25.
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zation in exchange for the financial benefits which accrue to
the licensee. Unfortunately, such isolated incidents of adver-
tising on public stations consume substantial blocks of broad-
cast time. As more such "driblets of advertising" emerge, signs
of an "avalanche" can be seen.
C. Program Underwriting
Greater concerns have been voiced in response to discrete
forms of advertising aired on public broadcast stations in con-
junction with program fare.89 Program underwriting, which is
a method of financing the purchase or production cost of pro-
gramming, is one such area of concern.
Underwriting is strikingly similar to program sponsorship,
which, as already noted,90 became a practical way to provide
support for commercial broadcasting. Underwriters, typically
private businesses or institutions, provide money to pay for all
or part of a program or series, generally requiring that the
money be used to produce or purchase a particular program or
series. In return, the underwriting business or institution is
identified as the provider of funding that makes possible the
presentation of the programming. Commercial sponsors, in
comparison, paid the cost of programming and in exchange
were given broadcast exposure and control over programming
such that they were able to tailor it to their needs.9
1. Origin of the Underwriter Identification Rule
The underwriter identifications have their origin in the spon-
sorship identification rules which have been in existence since
the Radio Act of 1927.2 The rules apply to commercial and
noncommercial broadcasters alike9 3 and require licensees to
make on-the-air identifications of program sponsors and under-
writers. The principle behind the identification rules is that
viewers and listeners are entitled to know who paid for the pro-
89. Noncommercial Educational Stations, supra note 85, at 23.
90. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
91. D. GINSBURG, REGULATION OF BROADCASTING 259, 264 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as GINSBURG].
92. Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F.C.C. 141 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Sponsorship Identification Rules]. The sponsorship identification rules were carried
over into the Communications Act of 1934 and currently appear as 47 U.S.C. § 317, as
amended. Hereinafter the text will refer to the identification rule as "section 317."
93. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (1975).
[Vol. 5
COMMERCIALIZATION
gramming presented on the public airwaves.94
In an early decision, the FCC noted that the objective of the
section 317 identification requirement is met by a simple aural
or visual identification of the sponsor's name." The identifica-
tion rules initially promulgated by the Commission were con-
sistent with both the objective of the identification
requirement and the obligation of licensees to provide an es-
sentially noncommercial broadcast service. The rules allowed
the use of a courtesy credit line for corporations that under-
wrote the costs of broadcasting cultural or educational pro-
grams, but limited such courtesy credit lines to mention of the
donor's name.96 In this way, the similarities between required
disclosures and indirect advertising would be kept to a
minimum.
Later, at the request of public licensees seeking to broaden
the scope of permissible information which could be included
in such identifications, these rules were amended to permit, in
certain instances, mention of a company division or subsidi-
ary.97 In Noncommercial Educational Stations,98 the National
Association of Educational Broadcasters (NAEB), speaking on
behalf of its member stations, petitioned the FCC to permit a
brief descriptive line to be added to the identification by busi-
ness name.99 Fearing the advent of undue commercialization
in public broadcasting, the FCC denied the petition,
explaining:
In our judgment, this is not necessary to provide adequate dis-
closure to the audience as required by Section 317 of the Com-
munications Act ... and would tend toward undue
commercialization of the medium. In particular, it would ap-
pear likely to lend itself to extention of the description to a
point which would be virtually the same as "institutional ad-
vertising", such as "craftsmen of fine furniture" or "located at
13th and F Streets in Centerville."1 °°
Given the fine line between identification and advertising, the
Commission feared that liberalization of the "name only" rule
would metamorphose donor acknowledgements into the "insti-
94. Sponsorship Identification Rules, supra note 92.
95. Boston Catholic Television Center, Inc., 40 F.C.C. 152 (1963).
96. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.503, 73.261 (1980).
97. Noncommercial Educational Stations, supra note 85, at 8, 9.
98. 26 F.C.C. 339 (1970).
99. Id. at 340, 8-10.
100. Id. at 10.
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tutional" specie of broadcast advertisement. 10 1
2. Deletion of the "Name Only" Limitation
By 1981, economic tides were changing for public broadcast-
ing. In the Second Report and Order decided that year, the
Commission took an unprecedented regulatory stance in delet-
ing the "name only" limitation to allow broadcasting of loca-
tion, logo, product and trade name, as well as other
nonpromotional information about the donor, when in the dis-
cretion of the licensee such information will provide clarity
and full identification of the donor. 102 The Commission predi-
cated its action on the finding that the overall approach taken
in previous proceedings warranted reexamination.
[T] he record now available to us provides scant support for the
contention that there has been a pattern of significant abuse
[by licensees] ... [A] few isolated complaints should not form
the basis for general proscriptive rules that affect all public
broadcasting stations.10 3
The approach taken by the Commission in the Second Re-
port is, however, entirely inconsistent with the stated purpose
of these related proceedings. These proceedings were not be-
gun in order to liberalize the underwriter identification rules,
rather they were intended to provide clarification and guidance
with respect to the Commission's rules regarding a host of ma-
jor commercial announcements and fundraising practices by
public broadcasters. 0 4 Twenty-two questions were posed by
the FCC in the Notice of Inquiry, none of which asked whether
the underwriter identification rules should be liberalized. 0 5
On the contrary, the Notice of Inquiry contemplated, and the
First Report proposed, a number of proscriptive rules to pro-
101. See id.
102. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 78, at 1 2, 23.
103. Second Report, supra note 82, at $ 2.
104. First Report, supra note 80, at 1.
105. The questions posed with respect to underwriting were:
(7) What guidelines should be used in determining what constitutes a bona
fide operating division or subsidy?
(8) What impact might result in limiting underwriting announcements to
one during any program of less than one-half hour duration?
(13) What standard should be used in defining what constitutes an
underwriter?
Second Report, supra note 82, at appendix C. See generally Notice of Inquiry in Dock-
et No. 21136 (FCC 77-162) (adopted March 2, 1977), 42 Fed. Reg. 15,927 (March 24, 1977).
[Vol. 5
No. 21 COMMERCIALIZATION
vide such guidance.1"6 The thrust of the proceeding in Docket
106. Other questions posed by the Notice of Inquiry were:
(1) Should the prohibition against "announcement promoting the sale of a
product or service" be limited to those announcements that directly pro-
mote such sales?
(2) Notwithstanding the matters raised in "(1)", above, should a different
standard be applied to:
a. course offerings of vocational schools, colleges or universities?
b. the sale of government documents?
c. the sale of material related to the content of the program?
d. the over-the air mention of credit cards in connection with fundrais-
ing activities?
(3) If so, what standard should apply?
(4) If a licensee originates programming temporarily at a commercial
enterprise, would it be able to urge listeners or viewers to visit the
store, or to mention the location of the origination point?
(5) If so, should such announcements be limited to fund raising
drives or subject to other conditions?
(6) If identified prizes are to be offered over the air, what guidelines
or conditions, if any, should be adopted?
(9) What guidelines should be adopted with respect to announce-
ments identifying those who provide goods or services to educa-
tional broadcast licensees instead of programs or funds for their
production?
(10) How many times per year are auctions held on individual sta-
tions? How many days did each auction last?
(11) During auction periods, how much of the broadcast day is devoted
to auction purposes?
(12) What percentage of the money raised during auctions comes from
underwriters of the auctions?
(14) Should educational stations be permitted to conduct auctions for
the benefit of other entities?
(15) If so, what guidelines should be applied, especially as to number
or duration of the auctions?
(16) Should different guidelines be used if a portion of the proceeds is
retained by the station? If so, what guidelines?
(17) How many times per year are fundraising drives conducted on in-
dividual stations? How many days did each drive last?
(18) During fundraising drives, what percent of the broadcast day is
devoted to fundraising purposes? (Estimates would be welcome
if precise information is not available.)
(19) What guidelines, if any, should be applicable to such fund raising
activities?
(20) Should the Ohio State ruling be applied to fundraising drives for
entities other than the licensee? If so, what guidelines, if any,
should be adopted?
(21) [unavailable].
(22) [unavailable].
Second Report, supra note 82, at appendix C. See generally First Report, supra note
80.
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No. 21136 was to stem the growth of commercialism in public
broadcasting.
In rejecting the proposals to regulate tightly the airing of
contributor acknowledgements and by going further to relax
the existing limitations on underwriter identifications-limita-
tions which a majority of former Commission members viewed
as essential to the preservation of the noncommercial nature of
educational broadcasting-the Commission seems to have
overstepped the bounds of these proceedings. °7
The Petition for Reconsideration filed by the Committee to
Save KQED, et al., argued that the Commission's radical de-
parture from its long standing position was procedurally defi-
cient in that the Commission failed to afford the public
sufficient notice to respond to the action taken.10 8 In answering
this charge, the Commission acknowledged that the "Second
Report undeniably marked a departure from the Commission's
prior regulatory posture concerning public broadcasting in
general and its fundraising activities in particular,"'1 9 but de-
nied that the public was not afforded sufficient notice and op-
portunity to comment. 10 Despite that the rules adopted were
largely inconsistent with the rules proposed and considered
throughout the proceedings, the liberal policies enunciated in
the Second Report were justified, said the Commission, be-
cause they were within the perimeter of the rulemaking (i.e.,
the nature of public broadcasting and its fundraising activi-
ties), and the adoption of such policies was specifically urged
in some of the comments filed by parties in the proceedings."'
Comments in the Commission's proceedings regarding the
noncommercial nature of public broadcasting were submitted
by, or on behalf of, 191 parties."2 Although the Notice of In-
quiry contemplated the adoption of proscriptive rules, some
commenters, as the Commission notes, "used [the] occasion to
press for a rule change permitting more descriptive underwrit-
ing announcements.""' Certainly the Notice of Inquiry did not
107. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 78, at 21.
108. Id. at 21.
109. Id. at 23.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. First Report, supra note 80, at 1. Most of the comments were filed by or on
behalf of noncommercial licensees and their support organizations. See id. at appen-
dix A.
113. Id. at 33.
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put the public on notice and afford an opportunity to respond
to the comments of the parties who used this backdoor ap-
proach to press for more descriptive underwriting
announcements.
Moreover, the Commission's response to these proposals put
to rest concerns which might have been raised by commenters
if the Commissioners had indicated a disposition to permit
more descriptive underwriter announcements." 4 In the First
Report and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Commission
unambiguously stated, "strict adherence to the name-only
identification requirement is necessary to preserve the essen-
tial nature of noncommercial educational broadcasting."' 15 In-
deed, this very assurance made the Commission's subsequent
deletion of the rule unexpected.
It is no wonder that the record contains only scant support
for retention of the "name only" rule and a few isolated inci-
dents of abuses of that rule. Sufficient legal notice may have
been effected by the Commission; however, the Commission
led no one to suspect that it was contemplating a radical depar-
ture from its long standing regulatory posture and the restric-
tive regulations proposed in those proceedings." 6 Thus the
record cannot be considered to be as complete as it would have
been if, at the outset, the Commission had led the public to
believe that it was contemplating liberalizing, rather than re-
stricting, its rules regarding the fundraising activities of public
broadcasters.
Still, the record does not contain convincing support for the
liberalization of donor and underwriter acknowledgements.
The Commission stresses three arguments of commenters in
favor of liberalizing donor and underwriter acknowledgements.
Those arguments are: (1) that licensees should be able to use
their discretion in determining how to identify their underwrit-
ers because in some instances "name only" identification is in-
adequate and the procedure established by the Commission
for waiving the "name only" rule is burdensome; (2) more de-
scriptive underwriter identifications will better achieve the ob-
jective of the section 317 sponsorship identification rule; and
(3) more descriptive donor and underwriter acknowledge-
114. The filings of Petitions for Reconsideration of the action taken by the Commis-
sion in the Second Report attest to this fact.
115. First Report, supra note 80, at 34.
116. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 78, at 23.
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ments will attract more nonfederal support for public
broadcasting.
(a) The Waiver Procedure Argument
In comments filed in response to the Notice of Inquiry,"'7 the
NAEB and other commenting parties118 contended that "the li-
censee should be able to include additional descriptive lan-
guage where required without having to resort to the
burdensome procedure of rule waiver."'1 9 The rules then per-
mitted the Commission to waive the "name only" limitation to
allow broadcast of a brief description when necessary "to avoid
confusion where a donor has a name virtually the same as that
of another business." 20 Theoretically, the rule could also be
waived by the FCC when necessary to identify an underwriter
well-known only by its product names. Proponents of the rule
change made no showing that the procedure authorized for
rule waiver was burdensome or unsuccessful in achieving ade-
quate underwriter identifications. 2' In fact, licensees had re-
quested waivers fewer than three times per year and in the
past the Commission had allowed display of an underwriter's
trademark to avoid confusion with a similar business name. 22
Consequently, in the First Report the Commission declined to
amend its underwriter identification rules. 23
In comments filed in response to the First Report, the parties
pressing for liberalization of the "name only" rule again argued
that the Commission's waiver procedure was too burden-
some. 24 However, these parties earlier conceded that in most
instances the "name only" identification was sufficient to meet
the sponsorship identification requirement of section 317.125 Of
course, for the rare cases in which it was not, the Commission's
waiver procedure was available to deal with such cases on an
individual basis. No showing was made to support the claim
that the waiver procedure was burdensome. 26 To liberalize
117. (FCC 77-162) (adopted March 2, 1977), 42 Fed. Reg. 15,927 (March 24, 1977).
118. See supra note 112.
119. First Report, supra note 80, at 33.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 34.
122. Id. See also letter rulings cited therein.
123. Id.
124. Second Report, supra note 82, at 37.
125. First Report, supra note 80, at 33.
126. See supra notes 121, 122 and accompanying text.
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the donor and underwriter identification rule on the ground
that in some instances deviation is necessary to clearly iden-
tify a sponsor seems a drastic remedy for the very infrequent
inconvenience caused by the Commission's waiver procedure.
Indeed, this cannot be the real reason for the rule change.'27
(b) The Clearer Identification Argument
The NAEB and others also argued that the additional de-
scriptive information was needed to disclose the relationship
between the underwriter and the program she supported. 128
The "name only" limitation, they asserted, resulted in
acknowledgements likely to confuse or insufficiently inform
the public in instances such as when the donor's name was
similar to names of other businesses, 29 or when an under-
writer's products were well known, but the underwriter's com-
pany name was not.' 30 A brief notation of either the donor's
city or town location, logogram,' 31 product or publicly recogniz-
able name they contended, would achieve a clearer identifica-
tion, thus promoting the objective of section 317.132 The
Commission did not agree. In their view such announcements
would not so much tend to disclose the facts of sponsorship as
they would tend to promote the goods or services of the under-
writer.133 The Commission was concerned with the possible ef-
fects of corporate underwriting on the programming judgment
and independence of noncommercial educational broadcast-
ers.'" Consequently, the Commission concluded in the First
Report that strict adherence to the "name only" rule was nec-
essary to preserve the noncommercial nature of public
broadcasting. 13 5
In responding to the First Report and Notice of Proposed
127. See infra text after note 139.
128. First Report, supra note 80, at 33.
129. For example, if a commercial franchisee of a national chain provided the fund-
ing, members of the audience would be unable to tell which franchisee was the donor.
See Noncommercial Educational Stations, supra note 85, at 8.
130. First Report, supra note 80, at 34.
131. Logograms are symbols, words or sounds (in the case of audio logos used on
radio and television) used to facilitate identification of a business or entity.
132. Noncommercial Educational Stations, supra note 85, at 8; First Report, supra
note 80, at 33.
133. Noncommercial Educational Stations, supra note 85, at 1 10; First Report,
supra note 80, at 34.
134. See supra note 133.
135. See supra note 133.
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Rulemaking, interested parties'36 again contended that the ad-
ditional descriptive information (location, logo, product and
trade name) would facilitate the recognition of the donor, and
thus achieve the objective of section 317.
This time, in the Second Report and Order, after reconsider-
ing the clearer identification and waiver procedure arguments,
the Commission abrogated the "name only" rule. This action
was not warranted. The Commission has never required more
than a simple aural or visual announcement of the under-
writer's name to meet the identification requirement, except in
rare instances in which name only identification is likely to be
misleading.
The clearer identification argument was rehashed in the
Commission's most recent pronouncement in these proceed-
ings.137 In the Memorandum Opinion and Order the Commis-
sion stated that the deletion of the "name only" rule satisfied
the statutory mandate of section 317 "since the donor [and un-
derwriter] acknowledgements, as allowed, better inform the
public as to the identity of the sponsoring entities."'38 How-
ever, section 317 does not mandate that donors or underwriters
be identified in the best manner possible. On the contrary, the
statute mandates only that the station announce that the mat-
ter broadcast is "paid for or furnished," and by whom.'39
3. The Real Reason for the Rule Change
The Commission's reasons for adopting more permissive un-
derwriter identification rules, that they would help achieve
clearer identifications and that the waiver procedure was
overly burdensome, seem a mere pretense in light of prevalent
economic concerns and favorable economic impact of the rule
change on financing for public broadcasting. A more credible
reason for the rule change seems to be that more permissive
identifications would "encourage more private donations and
136. See supra note 112.
137. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 78, at 11.
138. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
139. 47 U.S.C. § 317 provides in pertinent part: "All matter broadcast by any radio
station for which any money, service or other valuable consideration is directly or indi-
rectly paid, or promised to or charged or accepted by, the station so broadcasting, from
any person, shall, at the time the same is so broadcast, be announced as paid for or
furnished, as the case may be, by such person ......
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increase the total amounts of contributions."'"
In 1978, when the First Report and Order was released, the
federal government was committed to providing increased sup-
port to public broadcasting for the succeeding five years.
When noncommercial licensees argued in the First Report that
more descriptive identifications would encourage businesses
to support public broadcasting,' 4 1 the Commission flatly re-
jected such proposals on the ground that they would compro-
mise the noncommercial nature of public broadcasting. 4 2 In
weighing "the financial needs of [public broadcasters against]
their obligation to provide an essentially noncommercial
broadcast service,"'43 the balance then weighed in favor of
licensees' service obligation because licensees' financial re-
quirements were at least temporarily assured by the govern-
ment's commitment to increased financial assistance.
However, in 1981 when the Second Report was issued, the
FCC was both supportive of "unregulation" and cognizant of
the President's major platform, which was to reduce federal
spending and balance the federal budget. When the Commis-
sion again weighed "the financial needs of [public broadcast-
ers against] their obligation to provide an essentially
noncommercial broadcast service"' 4 budget cuts for all areas
of government spending, including public broadcasting, were
under consideration. Given the uncertainty of future federal
funding, it was not surprising that the balance was this time
found to weigh in favor of the financial needs of public
broadcasters.
Further indication that the underwriter identification rule
was liberalized primarily because of the increased financial
support which would accrue to public licensees is found in the
recently enacted Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of
1981.111 The Act signals an impending reduction for which
licensees must compensate by seeking and developing new
140. Second Report, supra note 82, at 4. See also Memorandum Opinion, supra,
note 78, at 1.
141. First Report, supra note 80, at 33. See also Second Report, supra note 82, at
18 n.7.
142. First Report, supra note 80, at 34.
143. Second Report, supra note 82, at 1.
144. Id.
145. Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357,
§§ 1221-1261.
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sources of nonfederal revenue. 46 One way the budget Act en-
courages and facilitates nonfederal funding efforts is by liberal-
izing the FCC's credit and underwriter identification rules. In
this respect, the Act is a ratification of the action taken by the
Commission in the Second Report and Order.14 7
The most obvious indication that the liberalized identifica-
tions are tied to fundraising is the fact that the codification of
the FCC's action appears in a budget enactment. A more spe-
cific indication is found in the House Report on the bill.148 In
the background and need section of the House Report, under
the subheading "Revenue Generating Activities," the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce notes one revenue gen-
erating activity to be the broadcast of logograms of (and by im-
plication other nonpromotional information about) program
underwriters. These facts, together with the overall import of
the bill, indicate that congressional authorization of commer-
cial-like underwriter identifications was predicated on the de-
sire to provide licensees with a more effective revenue-raising
device. 49
The House's view, if not Congress', is that an increase in
nonfederal revenues for public broadcasting is directly linked
to the ability of public stations to engage in commercial activi-
ties such as the broadcast of logograms 50 In the final sen-
tence of the section entitled "Revenue Raising Devices," the
Committee notes that it is "fully cognizant of the fact that pub-
lic broadcast stations must be free to generate substantial
sums of additional revenue from the pursuit of commercial ac-
tivities if the nation's public broadcasting system is to survive
during these times of austerity and still provide high quality
programming.' 5 '
One may take issue with both the Committee's and the Com-
mission's conclusion that public licensees must be allowed to
engage in commercial-like underwriting identifications if pub-
lic broadcasting and the high quality of its programming are to
survive. Grave danger exists that engaging in such commercial
146. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 67, at 14.
147. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 78, at $ 23.
148. "[TJhe House Report is very instructive since the Senate did not have a com-
parable provision, and Section 399A as proposed in H.R. 3238 ... was fully adopted by
the Conference Report . . . ." Id. at 13 n.19.
149. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 78, at 1.
150. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 67, at 16.
151. Id. (emphasis added). The Committee is speaking of all commercial activities
pursued by noncommercial licensees, not just those that approximate broadcast
advertising.
[Vol. 5
COMMERCIALIZATION
activities will change the noncommercial educational broad-
cast system into in a quasi-commercial broadcast system, and
will degrade the quality of the programming it presents. 152 Fi-
nancial considerations paramount in both the Act and in the
Second Report should not have outweighed licensee service
obligations as there is evidence which suggests that current
underwriting practices, particularly those of public television
stations, affect licensee programming decisions. Public licen-
sees must operate in a noncommercial manner if the high qual-
ity of their programming is to survive. 53
FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson has drawn a parallel
between the commercial and noncommercial industries'
search for a permanent means of financing. In his dissenting
opinion in Noncommercial Educational Stations,"4 the Com-
missioner noted that commercial broadcasting's first break in
its commitment to providing commercial-free programming
was:
institutional identification of those corporations that made con-
tributions to help sustain the programming expense.
The next was the relation of institutional identification to
particular programs, often related to the products of the
corporation.
The next stage was the more repeated interruption of pro-
grams, the mention of products, and finally that modern-day
propaganda art form: the "commercial."
That "non-commercial" broadcasting is well on its way down
the same road seems obvious.
Non-commercial television's great strength was to be its
availability as an alternative to corporate culture.
We then began to see brief credit crawls mentioning large
corporate givers.
Then corporations wanted association with particular shows
related to their products: Safeway's sponsorship of the Julia
Childs' cooking program, the McCalls' Patterns sewing pro-
gram, TWA's sponsorship of New York City's Channel 13 11:00
P.M. news.
1 55
Today these commercial desires are threatening public
broadcasting, as noncommercial licensees look to partial com-
152. This warning was voiced by Petitioners for Reconsideration of the Commis-
sion's Second Report and Order. Memorandum and Opinion, supra note 78, at 28.
153. See infra notes 215-237 and accompanying text.
154. 26 F.C.C. 339 (1970).
155. Id. at 348.
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mercial operation 156 as a means of financing day-to-day
operations.
D. Promotional Announcements
The natural progression of program sponsorship has been to-
ward the commercial, as it has allowed businesses greater ex-
posure and enabled them to put their messages across to the
public. Sale of broadcast time for commercials has also ena-
bled commercial licensees to generate more income. This very
path from indirect to direct advertising is currently being trav-
ersed by noncommercial educational broadcasters.
Initially, the Commission's rules prohibited "the broadcast
on noncommercial educational stations of announcements that
'promote the sale of a product or service.' "1 57 This prohibition
encompassed more than the definition of commercial adver-
tisement; it prohibited all announcements that tended to pro-
mote the entity mentioned, regardless of the nature of that
entity and whether any consideration was received by the
licensee. 58
Many noncommercial educational broadcasters, or parties
commenting on their behalf, presented constitutional and pol-
icy arguments regarding the right of public broadcasters to in-
form the public of (and to promote) educational and cultural
events when no consideration is received in exchange
therefor.159
In response, the Commission asserted that it was empow-
ered to proscribe all commercial speech of public broadcast
stations, notwithstanding the first amendment, and added that
it would be unwise policy to permit commercial messages to be
broadcast on public stations "just because [stations are] not
paid to broadcast the announcement [s]."160 The increase in
announcements containing commercial or commercial-like
156. See infra text accompanying note 177.
157. See First Report, supra note 80, at 10. The Commission's rules proscribed:
"(1) announcements made on behalf of commercial entities promoting their products
and services, (2) announcements made on behalf of nonprofit organizations, either at
their request or by the licensee's own choice, promoting activities where the sale of
goods or services was involved, and (3) announcements promoting the licensee's own
activities where the sale of goods and services was involved." Second Report, supra
note 82, at 1 8.
158. See First Report, supra note 80, at $T 5, 10.
159. See generally id. at T$ 6, 7.
160. Id. at T 10.
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matter concerned the Commission, apparently because of the
inconsistency of such announcements with the service obliga-
tion of licensees to operate in a noncommercial manner.'6 ' Be-
cause even free announcements may promote the sale of
products and services, the Commission concluded that a prohi-
bition of all promotional announcements "is clearly required
to preserve the noncommercial nature of educational broad-
cast stations.' 62
In the Second Report and Order, the Commission reversed
itself by amending its promotional announcement rules to per-
mit the broadcast of announcements for which no considera-
tion is received by the broadcasting licensee.'6 3 The
"consideration received" rule adopted by the Commission con-
tinued to prohibit the broadcast of announcements in ex-
change for consideration.'64 The Commission's reasons for
implementing the new rule include the financial considera-
tions mentioned above, 6 , first amendment considerations and
the desire to "unregulate" public broadcasting. 166
The change in the Commission's regulatory stance is pref-
aced with the statement, "announcements promoting the sale
of products and services that are broadcast because the licen-
see believes them to be of public interest do not always deni-
grate the purposes and objectives of public broadcasting." '67
Implicit in this statement is the Commission's belief that the
promotional announcement rules, as amended, do not unduly
compromise the objective that public broadcasting accomplish
its mission to unserved audiences in a noncommercial manner.
However, at the time of its decision, the Commission was in a
quandary regarding the purpose and objective of public broad-
casting. A comprehensive study of the nature and goals of the
public broadcasting system was underway in the FCC's Broad-
cast Bureau, but little headway was made in the study before
the Second Report and Order was released.168 Consequently,
161. See id. at 1 10.
162. Id.
163. See Second Report, supra note 82, at 11 14-19; see generally id. at 11 7-13.
164. See id. at 1 16.
165. See supra notes 140-151 and accompanying text; and see Second Report, supra
note 82, at $ 18 n.7.
166. See Second Report, supra note 82, at 1 16; Memorandum Opinion, supra note
78, at 11 2, 23.
167. Second Report, supra note 82, at 16.
168. Second Report, supra note 82, at $ 46.
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the Commissioners premised their Report on their own under-
standing of the nature of public broadcasting and established a
minimum regulatory framework based on that
understanding. 1
69
Petitioners for reconsideration of the action taken in the Sec-
ond Report 7 0 contended that the Commissioners had acted
rashly by proceeding to amend its rules "without a complete
understanding of the nature and goals of public broadcast-
ing.11 7' The Commission's response, that it "had a [legally] ad-
equate understanding of the system to justify the action
taken," indicates that the Commissioners limited their recon-
sideration of the concern raised to the procedural issue. The
larger issue, which is glossed over, is whether the "sprinkling
of advertising paprika" represented by the broadcasting of
such commercial-like matter is appropriate in light of the rea-
sons for which the public broadcast system was founded and
the type of service it is to provide. Presumably, the compre-
hensive study undertaken by the Broadcast Bureau of the FCC
would answer this question, but shortly after the Second Re-
port was released the study was cancelled, or rather subsumed
and modified by the study mandated by Congress on alterna-
tive forms of financing for public telecommunications. 2 While
the study mandated by Congress appropriately concerns itself
with identifying funding options which will maintain and en-
hance public telecommunications as a source of programming
which is alternative and diverse, the study is carefully circum-
scribed to consideration of "the development of sources of reve-
nue in addition to the sources of revenue available to [public
broadcasters] on the date of the enactment of this Act.' '17  This
means that the study will not investigate whether current
financing methods, such as promotional announcements, auc-
tions and underwriting, are compatible with the nature and
purpose of public broadcasting. The Congressional inquiry is,
in this respect, underinclusive. The issues are not limited to
the effects of new funding mechanisms on public broadcast-
169. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 78, at 23, 24.
170. Petitions were filed by the National Association of Broadcasters, and jointly by
the Committee to Save KQED, the Association of Independent Video and Filmmakers,
Inc., the Citizens Committee on the Media (Chicago) and others.
171. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 78, at 21.
172. See id. at 24. Telephone interview with John Kamp, Broadcast Bureau, FCC
(Jan. 14, 1983).
173. Act, supra note 69, at § 1232a (emphasis added).
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ing-they include the effects, in general, of commercialization
on the public broadcast industry. Failure to charge the Tempo-
rary Commission on Alternative Financing for Public Telecom-
munications (TCAFPT) with the duty of considering the
broader issue of commercialization in undertaking to study the
effects of advertising on public broadcasting is an egregious
oversight on the part of Congress. 174 The TCAFPT's inquiry
should .not have been restricted to new funding methods,
rather the TCAFPT should also have been directed to consider
whether current funding mechanisms are compatible with the
fundamental purpose of public broadcasting. For reasons
which are explained below,171 this comment concludes that
current promotional and underwriter announcements go be-
yond the limit appropriate for noncommercial educational
broadcasting.
1. Requests for Permission to Broadcast Direct Advertising
As early as 1952, the University of Missouri urged the FCC to
authorize "partial commercial operation" by educational sta-
tions in order to provide educational stations throughout the
country with the revenues needed to build and operate broad-
casting stations. 76 Commercial operation involves, among
other things, the sale of broadcast time for the presentation of
commercial messages. Partial commercial operation would
permit public licensees to sell a limited amount of broadcast
advertising time, subject to length, placement, periodicity and
content restrictions. 77 In 1952, the Commission denied the
university's request, stating:
In general, the need for non-commercial educational television
stations was based upon the important contributions which
noncommercial educational television stations can make in ed-
ucating the people both in school-at all levels- and also the
adult public. The need for such stations was justified upon the
high quality type of programming which would be available on
174. Congress attempted to facilitate non-federal support for public broadcasting,
in part, by relaxing restrictions on funding mechanisms then in use. In so doing, Con-
gress seems to be approving of the commercial funding mechanisms now used in the
public broadcasting industry. Consequently, the oversight may be intentional.
175. See infra text accompanying note 204-253.
176. Sixth Report, supra note 49, at 165. But see S. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN
AMERICA 222 (3d ed. 1976) [indicates that a similiar suggestion was made in the early
1930's by advocates of non-commercial broadcasting].
177. See generally Second Report, supra note 82,at 45.
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such stations-programming of an entirely different character
from that available on most commercial stations. A grant of
the requests . . . for partial commercial operation by educa-
tional institutions would tend to vitiate the differences be-
tween commercial operation and non-commercial educational
operation.... [I]n our view achievement of the objective for
which special educational reservations have been estab-
lished-i.e., the establishment of a genuinely educational type
of service-would not be furthered by permitting educational
institutions to operate in substantially the same manner as
commercial applicants ......
The Commission's opinion indicates that the maintainence
of the educational, qualitative and diverse nature of the pro-
gramming broadcast on noncommercial stations is inextricably
tied to noncommercial operation by licensees. Allowing public
broadcasters to engage in limited commercial operation as a
means of defraying construction costs and meeting day-to-day
operating expenses, the Commission fears, would cause the
purpose of public broadcasting to bend to the pressures of the
commercial marketplace. Market pressures would ultimately
enable commercial forces to usurp licensee control over pro-
gramming decisions, the end result being public broadcasting
programming complete with advertisements and fare similar to
that offered by commercial broadcasters. Because this would
change noncommercial educational broadcasting into a mere
variation of the already adequately served commercial broad-
cast system, such a result is undesirable.
In 1981, educators again petitioned the Commission to permit
partial commercial operation by public broadcast stations. The
National Association of Educational Broadcasters (NAEB)
and other parties commenting in the FCC's Second Report and
Order, urged the Commission to implement a fundraising ex-
periment called "Institutional-Oriented Underwriting"
(IOU).179 The experiment would have "permit [ted] public sta-
tions to sell broadcast time to help support their operations. 18 °
The Commission, consistent with its earlier ruling regarding
proposals for partial commercial operation,181 denied the re-
quest, stating that "[f] or the purposes of this rule making we
178. Sixth Report, supra note 49, at 57 (quoting Third Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (appendix A, part VI) 16 Fed. Reg. 3072, 3079 (1951)).
179. Second Report, supra note 82, at 1 45.
180. Id.
181. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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will adhere to our policy that the outright sale of time to com-
mercial entities for commercial purposes is inapproriate [sic]
for public broadcasting licensees."' 82
The importance of this denial is that it purposefully leaves
the door open for future consideration of the matter. In es-
sence, the Commissioners found the request for partial com-
mercial operation not ripe for approval. The NAEB's request,
they said, should be raised in a future inquiry after more is
known about the "fundamental purpose of public broadcasting
and the types of financial support that are appropriate to serve
that purpose. '"183
2. Permission Granted in a Limited Context
Congress has not been as reluctant as the FCC to act upon
the noncommercial licensees' request for permission to oper-
ate on a limited commercial basis. Congress allowed public
broadcasting to move one step closer to commercial broadcast-
ing in July of 1981, when it amended the Communications Act
of 1934 to permit public broadcasters to sell broadcast time to
nonprofit entities. Although the Act prohibits public broad-
casting stations from making their facilities available "to any
person for the broadcasting of any advertisement,"'84 it defines
advertising, by way of omission, to exclude announcements
sponsored by nonprofit entities.18 Consequently, noncommer-
cial licensees may sell advertising time to nonprofit organiza-
tions. This amendment was influenced largely by the hope
that it would provide an additional source of revenue for public
broadcasters.186
The FCC regulations regarding broadcast advertising on
noncommercial stations were recently revised to reflect the
promotional announcement amendment to the Communica-
tions Act of 1934. The "consideration received" rule adopted by
the Commission shortly before the enactment of the statute
was a "blanket prohibition against all sponsored promotional
announcements."' 87 In the Commission's opinion, the prohibi-
182. Second Report, supra note 82, at 46.
183. Id.
184. Act, supra note 68, at § 399B(b) (2).
185. See id. at § 399B(a); see Memorandum Opinion, supra note 78, at 8 n.14.
186. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 67, at 7, 13, 14. The House Report, in as far as
section 399 is concerned, seems to reflect Congress's view, since the Senate had no
comparable provision and this section was adopted by the Conference Committee.
187. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 78, at 9.
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tion "served to retain a substantial distinction between com-
mercial and noncommercial stations, by ensuring that public
broadcasters' judgments are made in the public interest, and
insulated from the commercial pressures of an open market-
place," but as the Commission is obliged to conform its regula-
tions to legislative pronouncements, it revised its rules to carve
out an exception for promotional announcements sponsored
by nonprofit entities.'88
The legislative and regulatory rule change that permits non-
commercial licensees to operate on this admittedly limited
commercial basis is regrettable. As the Commission noted in
the Second Report, "It] he current system of dual broadcasting
is dependent upon differences in the purposes, support, and
operation of the two classes of stations.' 1 89 The purpose of
public broadcasting, and its objective to accomplish its mission
to unserved audiences in a noncommercial manner,190 are not
furthered by operating "in substantially the same manner as
commercial applicants," albeit in this limited context.191 As
was the experience with commercial broadcasting, the method
of support and operation invariably shapes the character of the
programming presented. As the Carnegie Commission on the
Future of Public Broadcasting concluded, noncommercial op-
eration is critical to the provision of unique public broadcast
programming, programming which is intended to be alterna-
tive and diverse to commercial broadcast fare. 192
3. The Advertising Experiment
Although Congress has to some extent already taken the
"non" out of noncommercial broadcasting, it is now consider-
ing going the gamut by permitting noncommercial licensees to
sell broadcast time to profit-seeking entities in exchange for
consideration. An advertising experiment, which was ap-
proved as part of the compromise between the House and Sen-
ate on the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1981, is
now being conducted on the ten public television stations.
19 3
188. Id. at 9, 10.
189. Second Report, supra note 82, at 115.
190. See CARNEGIE II, supra note 29, at 125.
191. Sixth Report, supra note 49, at 57.
192. CARNEGIE II, supra note 29, at 125.
193. "In late March, [1982] seven of the 10 public TV stations selected to participate
in the 18-month advertising experiment (KCSM-TV San Mateo, Calif.; WHYY-TV Phil-
adelphia; WIPB(TV) Muncie, Ind.; WPBT(TV) Miami; WQLN(TV) Erie, Pa.;
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Persuant to the Act, advertisements on these stations may ap-
pear only in clusters at the beginning and end of regular pro-
gramming.194  Advertising clusters may not exceed two
minutes, and no advertisement may be broadcast more than
once per thirty minute period.195
The Act charges the Temporary Committee on Alternative
Financing for Public Telecommunications (TCAFPT) with pre-
scribing the type of advertisements which may be broadcast on
the stations participating in the experiment. 196 The TCAFPT
was given authority to permit the broadcasting of institutional
advertisements and advertisements relating to specific prod-
ucts, services or facilities, but not to public issues or politics. 197
At the conclusion of the experiment, 198 the TCAFPT will report
to Congress regarding the feasibility of permitting noncom-
mercial licensees to broadcast commercial messages spon-
sored by for-profit entities. 9 9  The TCAFPT must then
recommend legislative action regarding whether public broad-
cast stations should be permitted to broadcast qualifying ads
on a permanent basis.200 If the TCAFPT determines that
WTTW(TV) Chicago, and WYES(TV) New Orleans) began broadcasting both product
and institutional advertising." And now, a word from our sponsor, BROADCASTING, July
19, 1982, at 68. "Reportedly, [t] he other three stations in the experiment (WSKG (TV)
Binghampton, N.Y.; WNET (TV) New York, and WQED-TV Pittsburgh) are not experi-
menting with "commercials." WSKG is offering barter time to cultural and educational
"organizations." WQED and WNET are testing "enhanced underwriting credits." Id.
at 69. A recent issue of Broadcasting magazine, however, reports that Clairol, Inc. has
placed institutional ads on nine stations, presumably excluding WSKG. Clairol experi-
ment, BROADCASTING, Feb. 14, 1983, at 10. Congress also authorized ten public radio
stations to participate in the experiment, but only three of an initial 13 stations showed
continued interest, "too few, in the commission's opinion, to constitute [a] credible
test." Little bit commercial, BROADCASTING, Jan. 18, 1982, at 7.
194. Act, supra note 68, at § 1233(d)(1)(A).
195. Id. at § 1233(d) (2).
196. For a discussion of the type of advertisements which are being aired on sta-
tions participating in the experiment see And now a word from our sponsor, BROAD-
CASTING, July 19, 1982, at 68. See also Clairol experiment, BROADCASTING, Feb. 14, 1983,
at 10.
197. Act, supra note 69, at § 1233(d) (3) (A). Section 399 of the Communications Act
of 1934 prohibits public broadcasting stations from editorializing or supporting or op-
posing any candidate for political office.
198. According to the Act, the experiment must be completed by June 30, 1983, but
because the experiment got off to a late start there is a possibility that the experiment
may be extended. That possibility appears remote, however, according to Commis-
sioner James Quello. See BROADCASTING, Dec. 20, 1982, at 88. See also Public Stations
go to Congress for extention of ad experiment, BROADCASTING, Feb.14, 1983, at 88-89.
199. Act, supra note 68, at § 1233(e) (1). The report must be submitted to Congress
by October 1, 1983.
200. Id. at § 1233(e) (2).
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broadcast advertising sales to profit-seeking entities are a "fea-
sible" funding alternative, broadcast advertising may become a
regular part of noncommercial educational broadcasting.
IV
The Feasibility of Broadcast Advertising as an
Alternative Financing Method for Public
Broadcasting
The feasibility of permitting public broadcasters to air pro-
motional announcements sponsored by for-profit entities de-
pends upon several factors, including: (1) whether advertising
sales prove to be a viable funding alternative (good);
(2) whether compromise in either the content or quality of
public broadcast programming is caused by such limited com-
mercial operation (bad); (3) whether the independence of
licensees over program selection and control is adversely af-
fected (bad); and (4) whether partial commercial operation in-
terferes with the fundamental purpose of public broadcasting
(bad) .2' As there is little question regarding whether adver-
tiser interest will be great enough to insure that limited com-
mercial operation will prove to be a viable funding
alternative, °2 the first point of inquiry should be, as the FCC
suggests in the Second Report, whether limited commercial op-
eration is compatible with the nature and purpose of public
broadcasting.0 3
A. Nature of the Service to be Rendered by Noncommercial
Stations
In 1938, when the FCC created the new class of radio stations
designated noncommercial educational, 20 4 it intended that
such stations be used by nonprofit entities for the "advance-
201. See id. at § 1233(e).
202. A CPB commissioned study estimated that "[p1ublic radio and television sta-
tions could generate up to $164 million in gross revenues each year by selling 'clus-
tered' commercial advertising." Prospect of commercials on PTV, BROADCASTING, Sept.
21, 1981, at 26. According to a recent report by the National Association of Public Tele-
vision Stations, "the seven stations broadcasting conventional advertising have earned
$982,198 in advertising revenue from more than 3,500 messages aired through early No-
vember. 'In addition, they have received orders for $1,361,732 in advertising messages
not yet broadcast."' NAPTS report finds ad experiment a success, BROADCASTING, Jan.
3, 1983, at 69.
203. Second Report, supra note 82, at 46.
204. GIBSON, supra note 26, at 49.
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ment of [their] educational work and for the transmission of
educational and entertainment programs to the general pub-
lic. '20 5 The aims of public television were likewise to provide
instructional programming directed at classroom education,
and educational and entertainment programming directed at
the general community.20 6 General audience programming
was to be "of an entirely different character from that available
on most commercial stations. 2 7
In addition to producing, procuring and disseminating in-
structional, cultural and entertainment programming, the FCC
made clear that the service to be provided by public broadcast-
ers must also be noncommercial.0 8 For years the Commission
had struggled to eliminate the advertising excesses of commer-
cial broadcasting.20 9 One way it sought to deal with the prob-
lem was by creating the "noncommercial educational" class of
stations which required licensees to furnish a nonprofit and
noncommercial broadcast service.210 Creating such a system
enabled the government to appease the public's growing dis-
satisfaction with the use of broadcasting facilities for commer-
cial advertising purposes. Noncommercial operation marked
the return of commercial-free broadcasting.
More importantly, the Commission was convinced that the
presentation of unique public broadcasting was inextricably
tied to noncommercial operation by licensees. 211 To attract ad-
vertisers, commercial broadcasters must be able to demon-
strate that broadcast time for advertising is cost-effective. To
be cost-effective the stations must attract a mass audience, and
to attract such an audience commercial broadcasters must
often overlook the needs of smaller segments of their audience
in determining what programming to broadcast. Thus, pro-
gramming decisions of commercial broadcasters are made
205. Id. Respecting PTV, the FCC rules and regulations state, "noncommercial edu-
cational broadcast stations will be licensed only to nonprofit educational organizations
upon a showing that the proposed stations will be used primarily to serve the educa-
tional needs of the community; for the advancement of educational programs; and to
furnish a nonprofit and noncommercial television broadcast service." 47 C.F.R. § 73.621
(1981); See also CARNEGIE I, supra note 59, at 236.
206. See CARNEGIE I, supra note 59, at 1.
207. Sixth Report, supra note 49, at 57.
208. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.503 (1981).
209. See supra notes 15-23, 40-42 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 178-179 and accompanying text.
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largely in response to market demands. Public programming,
on the other hand,
creates programs primarily to serve the needs of audiences,
not to sell products or to meet demands of the marketplace.
This ideal demands that public television and radio attract
viewers and listeners whose tastes and interests are signifi-
cant, but neglected or overlooked by media requiring mass
audiences. The noncommercial nature of public broadcasting
has important implications for its programs, its relations with
creative talent, and its mission to unserved audiences.212
Prohibiting sale of broadcast time for advertising, it was be-
lieved, would insure that the programming decisions of non-
commercial licensees would not be dictated by market
concerns.
Public broadcasting stations have existed to provide a serv-
ice distinct from their commercial counterparts. Programs
should broach subjects of human interest and importance
overlooked by commercial television, and should be designed
to call upon the audience to listen, observe, think, learn and
appreciate, not to merely relax and be entertained.2 13 Public
programming formats also should be distinguished from com-
mercial formats by the absence of commercial interruptions. 214
Indeed, it can be argued that the absence of direct broadcast
advertising is the critical difference between the commercial
and noncommercial broadcast services. Most important, pub-
lic licensees should be responsive to he unserved interests of
their audiences. This requires that they not be shackled by
commercial restraints, and this means that they must not be
permitted to operate in a commercial-like manner.
B. Compatibility with the Nature and Purpose of Noncommercial
Educational Broadcasting
1. The New Underwriter Identification Rules
The historical belief that radio and television should broad-
cast programming which is educational in nature was embod-
ied in the notion that the service presenting such programming
212. CARNEGIE 1I, supra note 29, at 25.
213. CARNEGIE I, supra note 59, at 1.
214. Clustered commercials or commercial-like matter between programming is not
consistent with a "noncommercial" broadcast service. See supra text between notes
208-211.
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must be noncommercial. 215 This concern was the product of
fear of subjecting educational broadcasters to commercial mar-
ket pressures. 2
16
In the First Report, concern was expressed by various par-
ties, including public licensees, regarding the possible adverse
influence of large contributions by corporate underwriters on
the programming judgment and independence of noncommer-
cial licensees. 217 "Judgment and independence could be sub-
verted, even absent direct corporate interference, through the
licensees' quest for corporate dollars. 21 8 The problem as Rep-
resentative Henry Waxman (D.-Cal.)219 pointed out, is that
simply by making a contribution a corporation may have sub-
liminal impact on the kinds of programs public broadcasting
will undertake.220 Because approximately 40% of public broad-
casting programming is made possible by underwriting reve-
nues, 22' licensees must maintain a good rapport with
underwriters. On occasion this may mean delaying or cancel-
ling programs, or undertaking only the production of program-
ming which is not inconsistent with the economic interests of
the underwriters.222 The unfortunate result is a reduction in
licensee ability to exercise independent judgment over pro-
gramming decisions.
The problem is compounded by underwriters who are willing
only to finance programs of their choosing. As Fred Friendly,
former head of the Ford Foundation, stated:
[b]y deciding which shows [underwriters] will underwrite,
they have also decided what will not be on the air. By funding
those programs-the Met, drama-that are harmless, so far as
controversy goes, they are structuring the program schedule of
215. History had demonstrated that sufficient levels of educational programming
could not be maintained by stations subject to commercial market pressures. See
supra section of text beginning after note 35 and continuing through note 39.
216. See supra text after note 178.
217. First Report, supra note 80, at 34.
218. Id.
219. Rep. Waxman was involved in drafting the 1981 funding bill for public
broadcasting.
220. Weisman, Why Big Oil Loves Public TV, TV GUIDE, June 27, 1981, at 8 [herein-
after Weisman).
221. LEE, supra note 34, at 18.
222. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 155. Owens Corning Fiberglass spon-
sored the 'This Old House" home improvement series aired on KQED, San Francisco.
The big four oil companies are notorious for sponsoring ballet, opera, music and dra-
matic productions. See also Noncommercial Educational Stations, supra note 85 at
348, and see infra note 226.
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public television. It means that people sitting in advertising
agencies or corporate headquarters. . . determine what will be
223on the air.
This situation affects licensee decisions most where the licen-
see does not have sufficient resources to obtain all the pro-
gramming needed or desired. As many licensees run short of
program resources they often must choose between the evils of
broadcasting the programming which the underwriter wants
broadcast, broadcasting less expensive or inferior program-
ming or perhaps not broadcasting at all. This forces licensees
to cater to underwriter programming desires rather than to un-
served programming needs of the audience.
Because underwriters are the ones who "make possible" the
presentation of a public broadcast program, they feel responsi-
ble for program content. Consequently, "[c] ompanies engaged
in underwriting ... are tending to do more reviewing of scripts
and tapes and to attempt more influence than do most adver-
tisers of commercial programs. '"224 As one commenter put it,
this is an "odd development" in a "medium heralded as free
from commercial restraints. 225
Such review is undesirable, because it means that under-
writers, as a group, are a "market force," which as in commer-
cial broadcasting dictates the kind of programming that
licensees will broadcast.226 After feeling the effects of this mar-
ket force, noncommercial licensees "urged the Commission not
to formulate rules and guidelines which would increase depen-
dence on this means of support." 227 However, the action taken
by both Congress and the Commission in the Act and the Sec-
ond Report, respectively, does just that.
As noted above,228 Congress's concern for the financial well
223. Weisman, supra note 220, at 20. "[F]reedom is scarcely present when the
choice lies between the program that is supplied or nothing at all." CARNEGIE I, supra
note 59, at 89.
224. COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW, May/June 1977, at 12. See also GINSBERG,
supra note 91, at 258.
225. COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW, May/June 1977, at 12.
226. "Public affairs programming is often at the mercy of a very complicated
mix of groups [including] .. . corporate underwriters .... None of these
groups acts as an actual censor, but without adroit politicking to create a coali-
tion of support among them, those who wish to originate a program simply will
not be able to get it produced."
R. Hershman, A Singular Power 4,5 (1982) (The French-American Foundation/Aspen
Institute for Humanistic Studies).
227. First Report, supra note 80, at 34.
228. See supra notes 145-151 and accompanying text.
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being of the public broadcast industry was its primary reason
for amending the Communications Act of 1934 to allow non-
commercial licensees to air more descriptive underwriter
acknowledgements. Presumably, Congress also agreed with
the Commission's reasons for the rule change, as the Act is
more or less a ratification of the action taken by the FCC in the
Second Report and Order.229 Review of the Commission's rea-
soning is instructive, nonetheless, because it reveals the bene-
fits, besides the generation of additional financial support,
which it is hoped will result from the new rules.
(a) The Commission's Insulation Argument
Deletion of the "name only" limitation is predicated upon
the expectation of increased underwriting.23 0 The Commission
claims that licensee program judgment and independence will
be less frequently compromised under the new identification
rule because new businesses will be encouraged to underwrite
programming.231 A claimed benefit of the liberalized donor
identification rules is that a broader base of underwriter dona-
tions will reduce the ability of any single entity to affect the
programming decisions and independence of licensees,232
thereby providing insulation from market pressure. In prac-
tice, the Commission's theory of reduced interference through
broader based underwriter support may achieve the opposite
result of making licensees more, instead of less, responsive to
underwriter controls.
The liberalized rules essentially permit institutional adver-
tising such as location, logo, product and trade name to be
mentioned in connection with donor identifications.233 Pre-
sumably, now that licensees are allowed to broadcast more de-
scriptive underwriter identifications, underwriters will seek
the most descriptive identification possible." Because of their
need to maintain good rapport with underwriters, particularly
229. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 78, at 1 1, 3, 13.
230. Second Report, supra note 82, at 11 4, 37.
231. Id. at $ 4.
232. Id.
233. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 78, at s 14. The identification, however, may
not be used to promote the donor. Id. No guidelines were adopted by the Commission
to insure that the identifications are not used to promote the donor, and as was argued,
all broadcast exposure tends to promote the donor. See National Association of Broad-
casters' Petition for Reconsideration of the FCC's Second Report and Order in Docket
No. 21136 (filed June 22, 1981) [hereinafter cited as NAB Petition].
234. See NAB petition, supra note 233, at 9.
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large corporate donors, licensees cannot afford to ignore these
underwriter requests. 235
This licensee desire to appease underwriters will work to-
ward greater market control over public broadcasting, as now
underwriters can not only dicate the programming that they
are willing to fund, but can demand that they receive the most
substantial broadcast exposure possible as a quid pro quo for
underwriting the programming. Licensees will be able to resist
such pressures only if they have financial independence.
Given their current financial situation and bleak financial fore-
cast, such independence is unlikely to be achieved. Thus, un-
derwriters will be able to enhance their bargaining position at
the expense of reducing licensee independence.
The very discretion which the Commission intended to give
to licensees is being handed to the underwriter. Licensees are
not deciding whether the additional information is necessary
to achieve a clearer identification. Rather, they are responding
to underwriter pressure for more substantial exposure and are
deciding only whether the proposed "identification" impermis-
sibly promotes the underwriter.236
More descriptive program underwriting announcements do
more than expand the "blurbs" that precede and follow the
programming now presented on public broadcast stations.
They do more than pollute the "ether" with commercial clutter.
They enable underwriters to determine what programming
will be aired between the donor acknowledgements by condi-
tioning support upon the requirement that it be used for
purchase or production of designated programs. 237 The new
rules do not contain adequate safeguards to prevent major un-
derwriters from stripping away the already thin insulation
which protects programming decisions of public broadcasters
from the dictates of market concerns. In the past, underwriter
interference has been caused by large corporate donors, who
fund programs such as the Metropolitan Opera.238 Because the
underwriting rules place no limitation on the amount any one
235. See id. See also text accompanying note 221, supra.
236. For a discussion of the promotion restriction see Second Report, supra note 82,
at 37 n.18. The promotional announcement restriction has been since been modified
to agree with the Act. See supra notes 184-188 and accompanying text.
237. See Weisman, supra note 220, at 10. See also note 226, supra.
238. "[TJ he increased role of major corporations in public broadcasting was cited as
a possible cause of a loss in the service contemplated in the creation of a public broad-
casting system." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 67, at 9.
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underwriter may give to a licensee there is no assurance that
major underwriters will not continue to use their economic
clout to influence the programming judgment of individual
licensees. Without restraint on underwriting practices, contin-
ued subversion of licensee independence is possible.
2. Compatability of the "Name Only" Rule
What is needed is a donor identification rule which satisfies
the identification requirements of section 317, and which facili-
tates fundraising without increasing directly or indirectly un-
derwriter influence on the programming judgment and
independence of individual licensees. The "name only" rule
has most of these virtues. In particular, it is consistent with
the objective that public broadcasting accomplish its mission
to unserved audiences in a noncommercial manner. Certainly
the "name only" rule lacks the luster of a Broadway billboard
and is more difficult to pitch to potential donors who would like
to receive in exchange for their contribution the most substan-
tial and attractive exposure possible. But public broadcasting
does not exist to serve the underwriters, it exists to serve the
programming wants of an unserved public. True gifts are not
given as a quid pro quo, and unless underwriters are not do-
nors, they should be satisfied that they are contributing to a
worthy endeavor. Moreover, the principle of section 317, that
the public know by whom they are being persuaded,239 should
not be used to distort the reality of what has happened to pub-
lic broadcasting; a subtle advertising practice has become in-
grained in a broadcast system required to be noncommercial.
Commercialism has crept in under the guise of the gift-bearer.
Still, something can be done about it.
3. A Possible Compromise
There are ways of reducing the pressure brought to bear on
the programming decisions of noncommercial licensees. The
ideal method of financing public broadcast operations, of
course, would provide noncommercial licensees with funding,
no strings attached. This would insure that licensees are unin-
hibited in making their program selections. Outright gifts and
grants serve this function, but the current underwriter rules do
239. Sponsorship Identification Rules, supra note 92, at 141.
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not.240
Financing rules directed at underwriters may provide the
needed insulation. Congress and the Commission may there-
fore want to consider imposing a 50% dedication limit on all
underwriter contributions exceeding a set minimum amount.
Essentially, the rule would eliminate exclusive underwriting of
popular programs by major underwriters. The dedication rule
would require that one-half of all revenues provided by major
underwriters be allocated to a general purpose fund, and that
no more one-half of the funding for any program be provided
by a single entity. Licensees could then use the unconditioned
funding in a manner consistent with their service obligation
(i.e., to purchase or produce programming which may be con-
troversial or even contrary to the economic interests of some
underwriters).
The dedication rule would provide licensees with some fund-
ing-no strings attached, and, at least in theory, would allevi-
ate the pressure brought to bear on licensee program
decisionmaking by major underwriters of public broadcast pro-
gramming.241 The underwriter would not be associated with
programming financed by the general purpose fund. Conse-
quently, there would be no 'subliminal impact" on the licensee
as to the kinds of programs to undertake. Licensees would not
feel obligated to use the money in the underwriter's best inter-
est because the contributor's funds would not be earmarked
and it would be difficult to tell which underwriter's contribu-
tion provided the general station funding which was ultimately
used to produce or purchase other programming.
The dedication rule would also mean that at least two
sources of funding would be required to make possible the
presentation of any one program. This result would effect a
more democratic selection of popular programming.
240. The underwriter rules are essentially identification rules, they do not aim to
restrain underwriters.
241. It should be noted that the section 317 identification rule would not require the
recipient licensee to announce that a certain underwriter was the source of the fund-
ing contributed to the general station fund, which in turn made possible the presenta-
tion of the program. Instead, the licensee could announce that the funding for the
program was made possible by contributions to the station's general operating fund.
Then at a different day and time, the licensee could acknowledge the underwriter's
contribution to the general station fund. It should also be remembered that this dedi-
cation rule is but one suggestion of the type of financing rule which is needed to re-
place lost insulation from marketplace forces. The author does not assert that it is the
answer, but rather that it is the type of answer that needs to be explored.
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Although the dedication rule promises to substantially re-
duce underwriter interference, it will not eliminate it. This is
because half of the support provided by underwriters can still
be given on condition that it be used for production or
purchase of designated programs only. A rule that prohibited
any underwriting revenues to be so conditioned would impair
the contract rights of licensees to such an extent that the prac-
tice of underwriting would be effectively curtailed. Underwrit-
ers would simply find other ways to spend their money. As is
explained above,24 2 the new donor identification rule, absent
other restraint on the underwriting practice, is not compatible
with the nature and purpose of noncommercial educational
broadcasting because it allows market forces to infiltrate the
program decision-making process of noncommercial educa-
tional broadcasters. The "name only" rule, on the other hand,
may better protect licensees from outside interference and
control, but it may not provide funding at a time when it will
surely be needed. The dedication rule may better balance the
financial needs of licensees against their duty to provide an es-
sentially noncommercial broadcast service, then again it may
not. Further study may reveal that the dedication rule is in
fact unworkable, but whether this proposed compromise is a
workable solution is not the point. The point is that some
financing rule directed at underwriting may provide a better
compromise than either the old or the new rule. It is hoped
that the TCAFPT or the FCC will study this possibility.
4. Compatibility of Advertising with the Nature and
Purpose of Noncommercial Educational
Broadcasting
(a) A Congressional Oversight in The Feasibility
Approach
The feasibility of implementing direct advertising on a per-
manent basis depends, in part, upon the extent to which this
funding alternative can be implemented without interfering
with the essential nature of public telecommunications as a
source of alternative and diverse programming.243 This ap-
proach assumes that public broadcasting is not already inter-
242. See supra notes 217-238 and accompanying text.
243. See Act, supra note 68, at §§ 1233(a), 1233(e) (1).
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fered with-at least not impermissibly so. As noted above,21
public television is showing signs of interference caused by the
indirect advertising practices of noncommercial educational
broadcasters.
The approach taken by Congress also assumes that public
broadcasting stations are in fact providing programming which
is "alternative and diverse." While in large part this is true
with respect to the programming provided by public radio sta-
tions, there is evidence of increasing similarity between com-
mercial and public television programming.
The Aspen Institute Guide to Communication Industry
Trends 245 indicates that the level of noncommercial instruc-
tional programming has been significantly reduced since the
mid-1970's.246 "In distinct contrast, the PBS 247 programming for
the general public has steadily increased in the 1970's .... 248
The study credits a rising percentage of entertainment pro-
grams, movies in particular, with public television stations' ef-
forts to broaden their appeal.249
Today more than ever educational broadcasters are channel-
ing time and effort into programming which duplicates that of
commercial stations.2 0  This development is not compatible
244. See supra notes 219-227 and accompanying text.
245. See MASS MEDIA, supra note 62.
246. Id. at 310.
247. Public Broadcasting System.
248. MASS MEDIA, supra note 62, at 310.
249. Id. at 310-11.
250. In discussing the differences between commercial television and public televi-
sion, CARNEGIE I, supra note 59, at 1, notes that public television "includes all that is of
human interest and importance which is not at the moment appropriate or available
for support by advertising . . ." (emphasis added). Even so, numerous comparisons
between public and commercial broadcasting fare can be drawn: both broadcast mo-
tion picture classics, comedy shows, sporting events (tennis, figure skating, mara-
thons), documentaries, etc. Another phenomenon is the transplantation of television
programs from public to commercial stations. National Geographic specials, for in-
stance, previously broadcast on public stations, are now aired as sponsored program-
ming on commercial stations. Also, the popular program "Sneak Previews", a half
hour program of critical feature file reviews, began on PBS. Today, a very similiar
program, "At the Movies", has been syndicated for pre-prime time broadcast on com-
mercial stations. Arguably, because a feature film review program is now both appro-
priate and available on advertiser supported television, this type of programming is no
longer appropriate for broadcast on public television. Moreover, access for public
televsion stations was justified upon the fact that such stations would provide "pro-
gramming of an entirely different character from that available on most commercial
stations." Sixth Report, supra note 49, at 57. The program "Sneak Previews" ceased
to be "alternative" or "diverse" to commercial broadcasting fare when the similiar pro-
gram, "At the Movies", was syndicated for pre-prime time broadcast on commercial
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with the obligation of noncommercial educational broadcasters
to serve the segment of the audience whose tastes and inter-
ests are significant, yet unserved by media requiring mass
audiences. 251 By increasing programming for the general pub-
lic to broaden their appeal and attract more funding from the
private sector, public television stations have moved a long
way toward becoming a mere variation of the already ade-
quately served commercial broadcast service. The probable re-
sponse to declining federal funding will be even more
programming for the general public in hopes that this will at-
tract a greater audience support base for station operations.
Both of these criticisms demonstrate that the congressional
approach to determining the feasibility of commercial advertis-
ing on public broadcast stations is fraught with error. Public
broadcasting is already subject to certain commercial pres-
sures and is less diverse than intended. The feasibility study
should be concerned with whether advertising sales can be im-
plemented without interfering with the type of programing
which, ideally, would be broadcast by public licensees. Pre-
sumably, the comprehensive report which would have been
prepared by the FCC's Broadcast Bureau would have an-
swered this question. Congress's focus on the present state of
public broadcast programming lends credence to the belief
that commercialization is a consistent step in the evolution of
public broadcasting.
(b) Preservation of Commercial-free Broadcasting
Whether consistent or not, it is a misguided step to allow
licensees to engage in limited commercial operation. Public
broadcasting is to be alternative and diverse, but not only in
the sense of programming. It is to be alternative and diverse in
all respects, including program format, such that viewers and
listeners can not only tune into a different type of program-
ming, but can do so without being subjected to commercial
speeches. The preservation of commercial-free broadcasting
means more than just preservation of broadcasting free from
stations. Consequently, one might argue that "Sneak Previews" is no longer appropri-
ate for viewing on public television stations. Along these same lines, one may also
argue that even though PBS popularized the feature film review program, public tele-
vision stations should, if they are to fulfill their obligation to provide a unique program-
ming service, find other programming to broadcast.
251. CARNEGIE II, supra note 29, at 25.
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commercial restraints; it means preservation of commercial-
free broadcast fare. Because the ideals inherent in the crea-
tion of a national noncommercial educational broadcasting
service were as much to preserve commercial-free broadcast-
ing as to encourage cultural and educational programming," 2
the implementation of advertising on a permanent basis would
be entirely inconsistent with the noncommercial nature of
public broadcasting and its mission to fulfill the unserved view-
ing demands of its audiences.
The direct advertising that is currently permitted to be
broadcast on public stations, namely promotional announce-
ments sponsored by nonprofit entities and promotional an-
nouncements broadcast by noncommercial licensees for which
no consideration is received, should be prohibited because it,
too, is utterly inconsistent with the noncommercial nature of
public broadcasting and its mission to serve the public by pro-
viding programming which is truly unique and distinct from
that which is available on commercial stations.253
V
Conclusion
The new underwriter identification rule has the virtue of pro-
viding more funding for public broadcasting at a time when
federal support will be declining. To some extent, it also de-
regulates public broadcasting. On the other hand, the rule per-
mits licensees to air identifications which are indistinguishable
from institutional and image advertising. Attractive broadcast
exposure is being brought with underwriter dollars and the at-
tendant marketplace pressures on programming selection have
emerged. Public broadcasters must not be allowed to operate
in this commercial arena. Either the "name only" rule should
252. See supra notes 50, 53-57 and accompanying text.
253. Aside from these policy reasons, there are compelling pragmatic reasons
against permitting public broadcasters to engage in limited commercial operation.
Trade union contracts may have to be renegotiated for stations operating on a limited
commercial basis. Non-budget subsidies represented by section 118 of the Copyright
Act of 1976 may be forfeited by the switch to commercial nonprofit educational status.
Perhaps most important is the tax consequence of the advertising activities conducted
on stations licensed to tax exempt organizations. Apparently, the income derived from
the sale of broadcast time for advertising will be subject to the unrelated business
income tax. These matters are beyond the scope of this comment, however it is hoped
that these and other countervailing considerations will be given full treatment in the
TCAFPT's report to Congress.
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be reinstated or financing rules directed at underwriting, such
as the dedication rule proposed as a compromise 25 4 above,
should be implemented.
The promotional announcement rules also go too far for the
sake of providing more funding for public broadcasting. The
rules not only toll the death knell of commercial-free broad-
casting, but mark commercialism's rite of passage into public
broadcasting. Still, something can be done. First, Congress
should assess the general effect of commercialism on public
broadcasting. This can be done by charging the TCAFPT with
determining which funding mechanisms, including those now
in use, are most appropriate in light of the nature and purpose
of public broadcasting. Then, to assure that noncommercial
broadcasting remains noncommercial, Congress should pass
legislation which permits the use of only those mechanisms
which are most appropriate for public broadcasting.
Advertising, to the extent that it is now allowed, and to the
extent that it is being considered, should not be permitted. It
is grossly unfair to the many people who devoted their time,
energy and resources to creating this counterculture solution
to commercial broadcasting to allow public broadcasting to
mutate into a quasi-commercial broadcast system. To be an
educational and diverse alternative, public broadcasting must
be noncommercial. Indeed, the practical consequences of al-
lowing commercial operation bespeak this conclusion.5 5
If, however, limited commercial operation cannot be avoided,
then public broadcasting's commercials, like its programming,
should be alternative and diverse to comparable offerings of
commercial stations.5 6 Instead of typical soap commercials,
public broadcasting commercials should be informational. The
"infomercials" (informational-commercials) could be short
documentaries or lectures about the sponsor, its products or
services, and innovative ideas. 25 17 The Weyhauser Company
advertisements airing on commercial stations, for example, are
a step in the right direction. Thirty second spots, of course, are
not conducive to informational commercials, so fewer, but
254. See supra notes 240-242 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 253.
256. This is not to suggest, as National Lampoon satirically did, that public broad-
cast stations should air tobacco, hard liquor and firearm commercials.
257. For a discussion of "infomercials" currently shown on cable TV, see CABLEVI-
SION PLus, Jan. 24, 1983, at 4-7, 14. Informational advertisements have also been termed
"Infotisements," "Adformationals" and "Informationals."
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longer, quality commercials should be allowed between pro-
grams instead of the proposed two minute commercial clus-
ters. If prepared thoughtfully, and in good taste, the
informationals could be as intriguing as "Nova" episodes." 8
Public broadcasting should be commercial-free, but if it must
have commercial speech, then the commercial speech aired
should be informational and should enable the public to evalu-
ate the claims presented. Obviously, these advertising con-
straints will put off certain advertisers, but the public would be
better served if all advertisers were put off public broadcasting.
258. Take, for instance, the typical headache causing aspirin commercial which re-
fers to some laboratory test which found the sponsor's product superior. Imagine if
the ad went behind the scenes, explained the testing process and study conducted, and
allowed the audience to judge the conclusion!
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